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Essay Review
The Civil Rights Struggle in Retrospect
Harold Cruse, Plural But Equal: A Critical Study of Blacks and Minorities and
America's Plural Society. New York: William Morrow, 1987. Pp. 420. $22.95.
Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice. New
York: Basic Books, 1987. Pp. xii + 288. $19.95.
Reviewed by Robert A. Sedler
As American society moves toward the end of the twentieth century, it
continues to confront the consequences of a long and tragic history of
racism.1 The consequences of racism affect many of our institutions,
including the legal system and the legal profession. Blacks and other
minorities continue to be seriously underrepresented in the legal profession
and in the administration of justice. While law schools struggle to enroll
minority students in more than token numbers and to recruit and retain at
least some minority faculty members, 2 legal commentators debate the
constitutional permissibility and social utility of "affirmative action" pro-
grams. There is ongoing controversy over the scope of civil rights laws and
efforts to prevent and remediate racial discrimination. With the growth of
an urban racial underclass, the problems of poverty, housing, substance
abuse, and law enforcement have increasingly taken on racial overtones.
For all of these reasons, race and racial discrimination occupy an
important place in the law school curriculum. Because racial discrimination
has been the paradigmatic form of discrimination in American society,
much of equal protection doctrine has developed in response to it, and it
has been the point of departure for the constitutional analysis of other
forms of group discrimination.3 Civil rights laws have also been initially
directed at racial discrimination, and other forms of group discrimination
have been proscribed on the basis of their similarity to racial discrimination.
Because blacks and other racial minorities are disproportionately poor in
Robert A. Sedler is Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
1. I have elsewhere used the phrase "social history of racism" to summarize the history of
discrimination and victimization of blacks and other nonwhite minorities in American
society. See the discussion in Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences
of the Social History of Racism, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 677, 677-82 (1987).
2. For the underrepresentation of blacks in the legal profession and the impact of the
"racial education gap" on law school admissions, see Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution,
Racial Preference, and the Equal Participation Objective in Slavery and Its Conse-
quences: The Constitution, Equality, and Race, ed. Robert Goldwin & Art Kaufman,
123, 131-32 (Washington, D.C., 1988).
3. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, Secretary of Defense, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender);
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age).
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comparison to whites, an understanding of race and the consequences of
racism is necessary for students of poverty law, social legislation, and family
law. In urban law schools, client-contact clinical programs are likely to have
minority persons as clients. Finally, because some lawyers end up as policy
makers and government officials, law students need a thorough under-
standing of the problem of race in American society.
Our teaching about race in the law schools often approaches racial
equality from the perspective of legal structure. We tend to emphasize
constitutional doctrine applicable to racial equality and civil rights laws
designed to bring about structural protection against racial discrimination.
In so doing, we may fail to give sufficient attention to the more fundamen-
tal question of the limits of law in bringing about racial equality in the
United States. In his much-reviewed book, And We Are Not Saved, Derrick
Bell addresses the fundamental question of the limits of law. Bell analyzes
the impact of the legal struggle for civil rights on black Americans and
concludes that after many decades and many legal victories, racial inequal-
ity remains pervasive in American society-blacks still "are not saved."'4 Bell
maintains that racial equality probably cannot be attained in American
society as it now exists. Therefore, he contends that the focus of the new
civil rights struggle should be on 'justice for all," the eradication or
alleviation of poverty, and an end to all forms of discrimination. In contrast
to Bell, Harold Cruse does not argue for 'justice for all"; rather, he asserts
that blacks must save themselves. In Plural But Equal, Cruse, a prominent
historian, addresses the question of the "limits of law" from a different
perspective. He subjects the civil rights struggle to historical analysis and
concludes that "integration" was doomed to failure from the very begin-
ning.
Although I will offer a detailed account of Cruse's argument, there is no
need to do the same for Bell's book. Most teachers of Constitutional Law
and related courses are by now quite familiar with And We Are Not Saved and
the commentary it has spawned. The contrasting positions of Bell and
Cruse provide a context for a retrospective view of the civil rights struggle
and for some observations about the role of legal education in social
reform.
Plural But Equal
As the title of his book indicates, Cruse's emphasis is on the distinctiveness
of blacks and other racial and ethnic groups in American society. His
analysis of the civil rights struggle leads him to conclude that the integra-
tion strategy is fundamentally flawed and is thus doomed to failure.
Throughout the book he savagely attacks integration strategy and the
4. Bell's title is taken from Jeremiah 8:20: "The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and
we are not saved." Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial
Justice (New York, 1987) (quotations from Bell will be cited parenthetically in the text).
A sampling of reviews includes H. N. Hirsch, Race and Class, Law and Politics, 69
B.U.L. Rev. 457 (1989); Mary E. Becker, Racism and Legal Doctrine, 67 Tex. L. Rev.
417 (1988); Lino A. Graglia, Book Review, 5 Const. Commentary 436 (1988); Richard
Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform, 97 Yale L.J. 923 (1988).
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NAACP, which he sees as its primary architect. 5
According to Cruse, the late 1960s marked the end of a major civil rights
"cycle" (7)6; he sees the 1980s as a post-civil rights era. Cruse calls in
question the central premise of the modern civil rights movement-the goal
of integration. Taking the Brown decision as the starting point of the
movement, he suggests that a system of truly "separate but equal" educa-
tion would have been in the best interests of black children. He faults the
NAACP for pursuing an integration strategy in the face of the apparent
willingness of the southern states to equalize expenditures for segregated
schools (20). According to Cruse, the racial demographics of the South and
North sustain a biracial system (in which schools are either predominantly
black or predominantly white) that busing has not remedied (21). Thus,
when the NAACP rejected compromise, it denied blacks the benefits they
might have derived if public schooling had been allowed to evolve into
racially separate but educationally equal systems. The Brown decision, says
Cruse, actually did blacks a disservice7 ; the "separate but equal" doctrine
that Brown ruled unconstitutional should have been supplanted by the truly
democratic doctrine of "plural but equal" (39).
Brown fostered the illusion that actual integration-not just the eradica-
tion of all legally mandated segregation-would occur in American society.
Because Americans believe in the concept of race,8 however, the expecta-
tion that the Brown decision would lead to full racial integration was
completely improbable (37).9 Set against the goal of racial integration is the
fact of racial pluralism. As Cruse explains it: "The United States is racially,
5. Cruse says that in the 1940s, "the term 'racial integration' . . . had been imperceptibly
introduced into the lexicon of the NAACP as a synonym for 'racial democracy,' 'racial
equality,' and 'civil rights."' Harold Cruse, Plural But Equal: A Critical Study of Blacks
and Minorities and America's Plural Society 26 (New York, 1987). Subsequent page
references will be cited parenthetically in the text.
6. Cruse describes a "cycle" as a "course or series of events or operations that recurs
regularly and usually leads back to the starting point" (7). He says, however, that the civil
rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s was not the first civil rights cycle. The first cycle
(1868-96) ended with black civil rights advocates "beaten down in abysmal defeat"
(8). Cruse focuses on the defeat in Congress of the Blair Education Bill (10-11). The
bill-defeated in 1890, a decade after it was introduced-would have appropriated large
sums of federal money for public school education and would have required "separate
but equal" funding for racially segregated schools in the south (10-13). Although the
black leadership of the time supported the Blair Bill and did not make an issue of
segregated schools, the white political leadership in the south opposed it (13-18).
7. Cruse calls the Brown decision a "mindless act of social irresponsibility" because it
eliminated the black schools and so denied "the legitimacy of the important concept of
the community or the neighborhood public school" (197). He notes that during the
Brown litigation, South Carolina took the lead among the southern states by offering to
equalize the black schools by substantial increases in funding (199). According to Cruse,
when the NAACP rejected this offer, it lost the chance to fashion black political bases
around public school funding and administration (199-200).
8. There is a "social psychology of race in America" (36). According to Cruse, "Brown was
but the latest of a long series of judicial decisions stemming from the moral imperfec-
tions that had marred the American Constitution at its birth" (33). What the framers had
in mind was an all-white nation of English subjects, but institutionalized black slavery
negated the all-white ideal (33-34).
9. Cruse notes that before Brown, racial segregation stemmed not only from laws, as in the
southern states, but also from "racial custom, racial economics, racial politics, and racial
culture" (38) throughout the nation.
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ethnically, and culturally a plural society. The legal and judicial problem is
that the American Constitution [does not] acknowledge the pluralistic
composition of American society" (38). Brown, by mandating integration,
simply perpetuates the myth that separatist restrictions on blacks are all that
stands in the way of equality.
Full racial integration was resisted because it intruded on "sacred
relations." Using Frazier's gradients of integration,' 0 Cruse distinguishes
between those areas of American life that involve "secondary contacts," or
"secular relations," as opposed to "primary contacts," or "sacred relations"
(47). "Secular relations" are secondary because they are rather impersonal
(for instance, in the streets, on public transportation, and in places of public
accommodation). "Sacred relations" are primary because they are more
interpersonal (for instance, in the schools or residential neighborhoods).
The workplace falls somewhere in the middle. Progress in racial integration
is more likely to occur in areas of life that are "secular" (47). (This may
explain why there has been less resistance to civil rights laws prohibiting
discrimination in places of public accommodation and employment than to
laws prohibiting housing discrimination.) Thus, there was enormous resis-
tance to Brown because the integration mandate was directed at the public
school, clearly a "sacred institution" (47). Cruse explains the white flight to
the suburbs as an attempt to keep the "sacred areas" of home and school as
they were before the Brown decision (51).
In attacking the integration strategy, Cruse draws an important distinc-
tion between separateness and segregation. Because of the actual racial and
ethnic pluralism in American society, there will be separateness; separate-
ness, however, is not inconsistent with equality' 1 :
Philosophically, "separate but equal" is, in the normative sense, "unequal" only if
in social practice it is the governing intent to make separateness politically,
economically, and socially unequal, which of course makes such practices im-
moral. Thus, separateness, which is not immoral, became segregation, which is
immoral because it was not the intent to make separate equal .... Legally
imposed segregation was what rendered separateness implicitly inferior. Remove
the legal sanctions of imposed segregation, and separateness has the potential of
achieving equality in its own right. (67)
Cruse insists that "[r]acial segregation was not the cause of the inferior
education found in separate black public schools" (197-98). Rather, the
root cause is American educational philosophy, which ignores "the intel-
lectual and spiritual needs of nonwhite minorities" (198).12 If "the separate-
10. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United Sates 687-706, rev. ed. (New York, 1957).
11. Comparing the situation of blacks and white ethnic groups in American society, Cruse
refers to blacks as the "less equal" minority (53). He says that white ethnic groups have
the choice of how assimilated or how separate they want to be. Despite their suffering
a degree of exploitation, they were able to find employment and to improve their
situation by hard work (55). He sees white ethnics as a group set apart from blacks,
because class lines rather than race have been the main barrier to assimilation (59).
12. Derrick Bell has likewise been an unremitting critic of what he calls the NAACP's
"integration at all costs" or "racial balance" strategy to achieve educational equality for
black children. In And We Are Not Saved he continues the attack in Chapter 4, "Neither
Separate Schools Nor Mixed Schools: The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchil-
dren." The fundamental mistake, says Bell, was to "equate integration with the effective
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but-equal doctrine that Brown ruled unconstitutional [had] been supplanted
by the truly democratic doctrine of "plural but equal'" (249), there would
have been black community control over black schools, which, Cruse
maintains, would have made the educational system responsive to the needs
of black children. By demanding unqualified racial integration, the civil
rights movement "elected to barter away all potential claims that the urban
black community had to retain local control over black education as if it
were an unnecessary entitlement" (253).13
To achieve a "plural but equal" society, the civil rights movement should
have worked from the very beginning to encourage black economic
development, instead of promoting racial integration. Because the NAACP
adopted "noneconomic liberalism" as its guiding philosophy (75), it lost a
means of political leverage that might have extended meaningful equality
for blacks beyond "the phantom results of mere integrated racial equality"
(174).14 Cruse lists the many problems that confront urban black commu-
nities: "mounting black-on-black crime, unemployment, the menace of
drugs, illegitimate births, teen delinquency, family disorganization, and a
full catalogue of each and every malaise under the heading of ghetto
pathology" (256). Although he acknowledges that these problems are a
result of a history of racial discrimination and segregation, he maintains
that racial integration is not "the magic solution" (256). The real value of
eliminating discrimination is empowerment; that is, the important conse-
quence is freeing a minority group to develop resources that derive from
"its own political, economic, and cultural plurality" (259).
Cruse recognizes that there were clear gains from the civil rights
crusade. It eliminated the structural barriers, both legal and extralegal, that
stood in the way of black equality. It brought about at least the moral
condemnation of institutional racism and resulted in the enactment of civil
rights legislation that provided greater employment and educational op-
portunities for blacks (285). Nevertheless, Cruse emphasizes that only a
education [that] black children need"; "racial balance is not synonymous with and may
be antithetical to effective education for black children" (111, 117). Bell (120) and Cruse
(193) both invoke W. E. B. DuBois's admonition that blacks do not need either
segregated schools or mixed schools; what they need is education. See W. E. B. DuBois,
Does the Negro Need Separate Schools? 4J. Negro Educ. 328 (1935).
13. Likewise, Bell, speaking through Geneva Crenshaw, imagines the effect of different
Brown decision that would have focused not on desegregation but on equalization of
facilities and black representation in educational decision making. Under such a
decision, the Court would have held as follows:
1. Even though we encourage voluntary desegregation, we will not order racially
integrated assignments of students or staffs for ten years.
2. Even though "separate but equal" no longer meets the constitutional equal
protection standard, we will require immediate equalization of all facilities and
resources.
3. Blacks must be represented on school boards and other policy-making bodies
in proportions equal to those of black students in each school district. (112)
14. Cruse contends that from the inception of the NAACP, its leadership split over whether
primacy should be given to economic questions or civil rights questions. Because it was
"[ulnable to resolve this conflict programmatically at the time of its founding, the
NAACP dispensed with an economic program .. ." (75).
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relatively small (and favored) part of the black population benefited
educationally, economically, and socially, while "at least half the black
population would be pushed farther down the economic scale into a
permanent slough of poverty, unemployment, and welfare" (285). Thus,
the rise of a new black middle class in the 1970s was accompanied by an
ever-widening and permanent black underclass, hopelessly mired in pov-
erty and deprivation (285). 15
Cruse argues that, with the demise of the civil rights era, political
organization becomes the only means for change. It is time, he says, to deal
with the "organizational deficiencies that have hampered black progress in
economic, cultural, educational, and other social fields" (342). The civil
rights movement failed to address the central problem, the economic
powerlessness of black people (360). For most urbanized blacks, "the civil
rights of integration and upward economic mobility were meaningless"
(369). The future, Cruse insists, "lies in the economics and politics of the
'equality of plurality,' or 'plural but equal'" (369). This kind of equality will
be achieved only through systematically reorganizing black political, cul-
tural, and economic life (379). An independent black political party would
be the first step in this process (378).16 The main issue for the black
minority today, according to Cruse, is not "the unresolvable, ambiguous,
open-ended legalisms of equal protection," but rather "the reality of the
closed, privileged arena of economic competition for the rewards of social
status through economic parity" (382). Thus, the "bottom line for the next
black political manifesto is economic justice, without which there will be no
future black survival" (385).
Cruse concludes on a combative note:
In the future . . .blacks must struggle to save themselves because allies are not
promised. In organizing to save themselves, any political allegiance blacks would
consider extending to other minorities would have to be purely conditional.
Despite the false promises of the most recent civil rights cycle of the Sixties and
Seventies, American blacks still represent the most crucial minority group, the
most strategically positioned to impact on the institutional structures of the total
society. What is lacking is the quality of black leadership capable of harnessing
black potential. (391)
A Retrospective View
There can be little doubt that in the United States today we still have
"two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal." 17 There is an
15. Bell also makes the point that affirmative action programs have had a very limited effect
in overcoming black poverty. Quoting from William Julius Wilson, The Declining
Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions 110, 152 (Chicago,
1978), Bell notes that affirmative action programs "are not designed to deal with the
problem of the disproportionate concentration of blacks in the low-wage labor market.
Their major impact has been in the higher-paying jobs in the expanding service-
producing industries." As a result, the black community is developing a "deepening
economic schism ...with the black poor falling further and further behind middle-
and upper-income blacks" (Bell, 124).
16. Cruse believes that "the traditional civil rights leadership will oppose any attempt on the
part of an alternative leadership to organize blacks into an independent political bloc"
(379).
17. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1 (New York, 1968).
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enormous economic gap between blacks and whites, with blacks suffering
disproportionate unemployment and underemployment; the family in-
come of blacks averages little more than half that of whites. 18 There is also
an educational gap, with blacks continuing to lag significantly behind
whites in academic achievement and quality of educational experience. 19
Further, there is a power gap. Although racial demographics, coupled with
federal voting rights laws, have increased the number of black officehold-
ers, particularly in the central cities where the black population is concen-
trated, blacks continue to be seriously underrepresented in positions of
power, in the elite professions, and in the economic mainstream. 20 Finally,
blacks are physically separate from whites. The black population is concen-
trated within the central cities of the nation's largest metropolitan areas,
where they generally live in isolation from both urban and suburban
whites.21 Truly, there are two societies, "separate and unequal," and it is
difficult to disagree with Bell, speaking through his heroine Geneva
Crenshaw, when he writes: "the once swiftly moving march toward racial
equality through law reform has slowed to a walk, leaving millions of black
Americans no better off [than] they were before the civil rights movement"
(45).
At the same time, major structural changes have been brought about in
American society through the civil rights struggle. As Bell emphasizes in his
book, the civil rights struggle concentrated on attacking the existing
structural impediments that denied equality to blacks. The struggle has
been largely successful in the sense that the Constitution has been inter-
preted to prohibit state-imposed racial segregation and other traditional
forms of intentional governmental discrimination against blacks. Federal
laws now prohibit racial discrimination in voting, employment, public
accommodations, and housing. Similar protection is afforded by the laws of
many states. This means that there is now in place a system of prevention:
the law prohibits present discrimination against blacks by the government
and by most private entities, and it provides remedies for such discrimina-
tion.
The system of prevention, however, does not purport to deal directly
with the present consequences of the social history of racism, nor is it
designed to do so. Because the consequences are so pervasive, self-
perpetuating, and self-reinforcing,22 the system of prevention, even if
vigorously and fully enforced, will do relatively little to alter the societally
disadvantaged and subordinate position of blacks.23 Indeed, the system of
18. See the discussion of the economic gap in Sedler, supra note 1, at 678-80.
19. Id. at 680.
20. Id. at 680-81.
21. Id. at 681.
22. See the discussion of the self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing nature of racial
inequality, id. at 682-83, n.12.
23. Although civil rights laws in voting, employment, and housing in some circumstances
reach action having a racially discriminatory effect, the Constitution reaches only
intentionally discriminatory action. Racially neutral action, however, will frequently
interact with the consequences of the social history of racism to disadvantage blacks. And
even when the test is "racially discriminatory effect," the action may still be found to be
justifiable. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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prevention has built-in limits. As Bell has emphasized, the Supreme Court
has not interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as expansively as it could
have to promote equality for blacks. 24 In fact, in affirmative action cases,
the Court is now interpre"jng e Fourteenth Amendment as limiting the
power of government to (use racial preference for blacks as a means of
bringing about racial equaiy.25
In my own view, the most important failure of interpretation has
occurred in the area of constitutionally mandated school desegregation.
The Court has adhered to the de jure-de facto distinction and has been
unwilling to impose a constitutional obligation on the states to operate
racially integrated schools to the maximum extent feasible.26 It has also
sharply limited the circumstances in which a court can order metropolitan
desegregation in order to remedy the de jure segregation existing in an
urban school district. 27 The Court has in effect ensured that the educational
gap between blacks and whites in American society will remain and that the
life choices of countless black children will be diminished.
Both Cruse and Bell discount the importance of racial integration in
education. They argue that the focus should be on effective education for
black children. As Bell puts it, racial integration "is not synonymous with,
and may be antithetical to, effective education for black children" (117).28
I find myself in sharp disagreement with both authors on this issue. In the
real world in which black children live, racially integrated education is all
24. Bell treats the issue in his seventh chapter, "The Declining Importance of the
Equal-Protection Clause: The Chronicle of the Amber Cloud." He argues that "[wihen
minorities most need the Fourteenth Amendment's shield, the Court does not seem to
respond. . . . So much of the Court's sensitivity is reserved for white concerns that
there seems to be little left for black needs" (167, 168). He also notes that "[s]uspect-
classification doctrine has helped relatively powerless minorities, but only when the
classification under review is so blatantly and arbitrarily discriminatory that the Court
could strike it down under a much less exacting standard of review" (175). See also
Robert Allen Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakhe v. Regents of
the University of California, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 329, 370-72 (1977) ("The compelling
state interest test thus has been of no utility in enabling the Supreme Court to deal with
the constitutionality of racial discrimination, and is not in practice the frame of reference
with which the Court has approached this question." Id. at 372).
25. In chapter 5, "The Racial Barrier to Reparations: The Chronicle of the Black
Reparations Foundation," Bell criticizes the 'judicial tendency to use-in order to
forestall effective remediation of discrimination already suffered-standards established
by blacks to end discrimination" (133-34). He says that Bakke (Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)) "is an unhappy example of this practice" (134).
In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989), the Supreme
Court emphasized that strict scrutiny applies to remediating racial preference, stating
that, "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."
26. See Robert Allen Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegregation: An Inquiry Into
the Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L.J. 879, 882-926 (1979-80). For the
author's argument that the Constitution should be interpreted as imposing such an
obligation on the states, see id. at 926-69.
27. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). On the subject of metropolitan desegregation,
see also Robert Allen Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On
Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975
Wash. U.L.Q. 535.
28. Cruse goes even further, advocating black community control over black schools, which,
he maintains, would make the educational system responsive to the needs of black
children (199).
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too often synonymous with effective education for black children. The
available data strongly indicate that black children who are attending
racially integrated schools perform better academically, as measured by
performance on standardized achievement tests, than black children who
are attending predominantly black schools. This is not because of racial
mixing as such, but because such factors as the predominantly middle-class
composition of the typical integrated school and the availability of better
teachers, curricula, and facilities in integrated schools than in black
schools. 29 In the real world, there is a strong correlation between atten-
dance at racially integrated schools and the improved academic achieve-
ment and of black children.
But precisely because the Constitution has not been interpreted as
requiring the state to operate racially integrated schools to the maximum
extent feasible, a large number of black children attend school in urban
school systems that are comprised primarily of low- and moderate-income
black children. The Detroit school system, for instance, is "black
controlled"-a majority of the board of education, the superintendent,
most of the administrators, and a majority of the teachers and principals are
black. According to Cruse, this should make the educational system more
responsive to the needs of black children, and perhaps it does. But if Detroit
is any example, this kind of school system is not one in which black children
thrive.3 0 They generally have significantly lower levels of academic achieve-
ment than students elsewhere in the state, and they fall further behind
national norms with each additional year of schooling. Almost sixty percent
of them never graduate from high school, and frequently they attend
school in a condition of social disorganization.3' Black children are similarly
disadvantaged in other urban school systems in the United States. Plainly,
racially integrated schools would go a long way toward achieving racial
equality in the United States.
Bell contends that the Court could also have interpreted the equal
protection clause as invalidating laws that in practice have a racially
discriminatory effect (175). A discriminatory effect rather than a discrimi-
natory purpose standard3 2 could have provided greater constitutional
protection against governmental action detrimental to the interests of black
Americans. Further, the Court could have interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment more favorably for blacks by holding that overcoming the
present consequences of past societal discrimination is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Although this interpretation, which would justify
affirmative action measures that give preference to blacks and other
29. For an extended discussion, see Sedler, supra note 26, at 949-50 & nn.275-78; Robert
A. Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken v. Bradley, 133 Wayne L. Rev. 1693,
1712-19 (1987).
30. It is a matter of common knowledge that except for two city-wide selective high schools
and perhaps a few elementary schools, middle-class black and white parents residing in
Detroit will not use the Detroit public schools.
31. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 26, at 1709, 1707.
32. Under the "effect" standard, actions that perpetuate the consequence of historical
racism would be unconstitutional unless supported by strong justification. Sedler, supra
note I, at 704-20, 731-37.
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racial-ethnic minorities, secured four votes in Bakke,33 it has since been
decisively rejected by the Court.3 4 Rather than encouraging the equal
participation of blacks in all important aspects of American life, the Court
has limited the permissible use of racial preference to achieving educational
diversity (as in Bakke) and to overcoming the present consequences of the
government's own identified past discrimination.35
In assessing the effectiveness of the civil rights struggle, we must
recognize that the Court itself has stopped short of giving maximum
constitutional protection to measures that aspire to achieve racial equality.
Nonetheless, both Bell and Cruse demonstrate very clearly the "limits of
law." Legal action alone cannot overcome the present consequences of
generations of racism. Bell may emphasize a 'just society for all," while
Cruse emphasizes "black pluralism," but both agree that the central
problem for black Americans today is racial poverty and economic power-
lessness. Because the civil rights struggle concentrated almost entirely on
attacking the existing structural impediments that denied equality to blacks,
it could affect the central problem only marginally. Although many
impediments have been removed and a system for preventing racial
discrimination has been established, these advances do not deal directly
with the black Americans' heritage of racial poverty and economic power-
lessness.
What can law teachers learn from a retrospective view of the civil rights
struggle? We must recognize that there are indeed "limits of law." Even if
the legal struggle for racial equality had been entirely successful, even if the
Supreme Court had given maximum constitutional protection to aspira-
tions for racial equality, even if the system of prevention had operated to
perfection, we would still be a very long way from achieving a racially equal
society. The consequences of our history of racism are so pervasive and
self-perpetuating that the system of prevention can do little to alter the
disadvantaged and subordinate position of blacks. Thus, we must recognize
that in American society today we cannot separate questions of race from
questions of poverty and class. Although there are issues of race distinct
from issues of poverty, such as affirmative action and residential racial
integration, these are issues that primarily affect only middle-class blacks.
The problems of black urban underclass remain beyond the reach of such
remedies. Finally, we must reorient our teaching about race in the law
schools. It is no longer enough to approach racial equality from the
perspective of legal structure and to emphasize constitutional doctrine and
33. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and White supported this position.
34. See the discussion in Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727.
35. AsJustice O'Connor stated in Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986):
"The Court is in agreement that . .. remedying past or present racial discrimination
by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a
carefully constructed affirmative action program" (O'Connor, J., concurring). There
must be findings of identified past discrimination, and the findings must provide the
government with a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary." Id. at 277, quoted in Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724. Wygant actually imposes serious
limits on preferential programs; the effort to maintain minority hiring gains by
protecting blacks from layoffs was deemed unconstitutional.
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civil rights laws. Rather, we must help our students gain an understanding
of how racial inequality came to exist in American society, and why there
are "limits of law" in bringing it to an end. We must explore social and
economic policy with our students as well. As the United States moves into
a new civil rights cycle, our teaching about race and the role of the law in
bringing about racial equality must move in a new direction as well.
